to his engagements with Alexander; proofs of which were to be found in
the coldness of his relations with Turkey and Sweden, which had been
delivered up to Russia, one almost entirely, the other shorn of Finland,
and even of the Isle of Aland, which was so near Stockholm. That he had
only replied to the distressed appeal of the Swedes, by advising them to
make the cession.

"That, nevertheless, since 1809, the Russian army destined to act in
concert with Poniatowski in Austrian Gallicia had come forward too late,
was too weak, and had acted perfidiously; that since that time,
Alexander, by his ukase of the 31st of December, 1810, had abandoned the
continental system, and by his prohibitions declared an actual war
against French commerce; that he was quite aware that the interest and
national spirit of the Russians might have compelled him to that, but
that he had then communicated to their emperor that he was aware of his
position, and would enter into every kind of arrangement which his
repose required; in spite of which, Alexander, instead of modifying his
ukase, had assembled 80,000 men, under pretence of supporting his
custom-house officers; that he had suffered himself to be seduced by
England; that, lastly, he even now refused to recognize the
thirty-second military division, and demanded the evacuation of Prussia
by the French; which was equivalent to a declaration of war."

Through all these complaints, some persons thought they perceived that
the pride of Napoleon was wounded by the independent attitude which
Russia was daily resuming. The dispossession of the Russian Princess of
Oldenburg of her duchy led to other conjectures; it was said that hints
had been given both at Tilsit and Erfurt about a divorce, after which a
closer alliance might be contracted with Russia; that these hints had
not been encouraged, and that Napoleon retained a resentful remembrance