cent instead of short-term loans at this rate, there should be a good
investment field for it in America.

Russia is an unconquerable country, and her securities at a good rate
should be attractive for some American capital.

There is no reason why the 3 per cent bonds of Germany should not soon
be investigated for investment purposes in America. The German debt is
very small and, however long the war may continue, German bonds will
ultimately be paid. They are quoted now at about 70, and, with the
discount on exchange, they may be purchased from America at nearly 60,
or to get 5 per cent on the investment, to say nothing of possible
appreciation toward par in the future.

One may well believe the Germans to be misled in this war, and yet
properly await opportunity to purchase at the right time their
outstanding national bonds when these can be purchased so much more
advantageously toward the end of the war than in the beginning of the
era of peace, which must in time follow. Is it not just as neutral to
purchase German bonds from the Germans as to purchase ships or our own
railroad shares from Germany?

A great and primary lesson for the United States is in a thorough
understanding that this war was caused by tariffs. The United States
is the home of protective tariffs. The sentiment under a protective
tariff is national selfishness. England has bought in other markets
wherever she could buy cheapest, and has kept her ports open to the
cheapest markets. This may be her selfishness.

It may, however, remain for the United States, while maintaining a