The French had been warned many months publicly and privately that
their mobilization plans would be found faulty in case of sudden
hostilities. The railways moved perishable goods at the rate of thirty
miles a day while German and Austrian railways bore military trains at
the rate of thirty miles an hour.

So ill prepared were the French in their mobilization plans that they
actually summoned to arms the men who were to man the railways, and the
railways themselves were deficient in rolling-stock to move the troops.
The citizens responded promptly enough, but France had no bureaucracy
or military plans to match those of Germany, and, as throughout French
history, the leaders of the people failed at the crucial moment. The
plodding English had to help out the French railway plans, and then had
to turn around and find their own railroad defects. When England first
sounded the call to arms, men deserted the railroad service to go into
training to such an extent that the authorities had to stop it and
maintain transportation as, of course, an important arm of the
war-service.

The history of the unpreparedness of both England and France has yet to
be written. It would not be useful to print much that is already
known. There are two political sentiments in both countries, and
political issues will rise again in both after the war.

A little contemplation here will show the extravagance of many
estimates of the number of men to be put in the field in time of war.
Many estimates have taken little account of the number of men required
to handle a modern transportation service, and the supply organization
to back up an effective army at the front. Transportation and
war-supplies are on such an expanded basis as was not dreamed of a few