There is no doubt whatever that all Herr von Tschirsky's private
speeches at this time were attuned to the tone of "Now or Never," and
it is certain that the German Ambassador declared his opinion to be
"that at the present moment Germany was prepared to support our point
of view with all her moral and military power, but whether this would
prove to be the case in future if we accepted the Serbian rebuff
appears to me doubtful." I believe that Tschirsky in particular was
firmly persuaded that in the very near future Germany would have to go
through a war against France and Russia, and he considered that the
year 1914 would be more favourable than a later date. For this reason,
because first of all he did not believe in the fighting capacity of
either Russia or France, and secondly because--and this is a very
important point--he was convinced that he could bring the Monarchy
into this war, while it appeared doubtful to him that the aged and
peace-loving Emperor Francis Joseph would draw the sword for Germany
on any other occasion where the action would centre less round him, he
wished to make use of the Serbian episode so as to be sure of
Austria-Hungary in the deciding struggle. That, however, was his
policy, and not Bethmann's.

This, I repeat, is the impression produced on me by lengthy
conversations with Count Tisza--an impression which has been confirmed
from other sources. I am persuaded, however, that Tschirsky, in
behaving as he did, widely overstretched his prescribed sphere of
activity. Iswolsky was not the only one of his kind. I conclude this
to be so, since Tschirsky, as intimated in a former dispatch, was
never in a position to make an official declaration urging for war,
but appears only to have spoken after the manner of diplomatic
representatives when anxious to adapt the policy of their Government
to their own point of view. Undoubtedly Tschirsky transmitted his