ultimatum right was so undoubtedly on our side.

At all events, the Tschirsky group dreaded such an insipid solution,
and had insisted, therefore, on drastic action. In 1870 Bismarck was
the attacking party, and he succeeded in interchanging the parts. We
also succeeded, but in an opposite sense.


4

Then came our greatest disaster: the German entry into Belgium.

Had England remained neutral we should not have lost the war. In his
book, "Ursachen und Ausbruck des Krieges," page 172, Jagow tells how
on August 4, towards the close of the Reichstag session, the English
Ambassador appeared there and again asked whether Germany would
respect Belgium's neutrality. At that time German troops were already
on Belgian soil. On hearing that, the Ambassador retired, but,
returning in a few hours, demanded a declaration, to be handed in
before midnight, that the further advance of the German troops into
Belgium would cease, otherwise he was instructed to ask for his
passport and England would then protect Belgium. Germany refused, and
the consequence was a declaration of war by England.

That England on the same day sent word to Belgium that she would
resist with her utmost strength any violation of her neutrality is
fully in accordance with the steps taken at Berlin by the English
Ambassador.

Two days before, on August 2, the English Cabinet certainly gave