competent to lead them therein.

Bismarck created the German Empire out of Düppel, Königgrätz and
Sedan. His policy was one of "blood and iron"--and for fifty years
that policy of violence and violent means had been engrained in the
mind of every German schoolboy as the gospel of diplomatic art--but
Bismarck was not able to bequeath to the German people his genial
efficiency, wisdom and prudence in the use of his violent means.
Bismarck carefully prepared the wars of 1866 and 1870, and struck when
he held good cards in his hand. The Germany of William II. had no
desire for war, but one day plunged headlong into it, and during the
first week had already created political situations which were beyond
her power to cope with. Belgium and Luxembourg were treated on the
Bismarckian principle of "Might before Right," and the world rose
against Germany. I say world, because England's power extended over
the world.

At the beginning of the war England stood at "order arms." It would
have been entirely true to her traditional policy to allow Germany to
fight against France and Russia and mutually weaken each other, then
at a given moment to intervene and enjoin peace. England was forced to
join in by Germany threatening to establish herself in Belgium. How
far the German invasion of Belgium can morally be extenuated owing to
a French purpose to do likewise has still not been made clear--but
this argument does not apply to Luxembourg, and the breach of right
remains the same whether the country where it occurs be large or
small.

The invasion of Belgium and Luxembourg was a stroke of the Bismarckian
policy of violence, not carried out by politicians but by generals who