whole world a feeling of antipathy and alarm and effected that moral
coalition against Germany which in this war has found such terribly
practical expression. On the other hand, I am fairly convinced that
German, or rather Prussian tendencies have been misunderstood by the
world, and that the leading German statesmen never had any intention
of acquiring world dominion. They wished to retain Germany's place in
the sun, her rank among the first Powers of the world; it was
undoubtedly her right, but the real and alleged continuous German
provocation and the ever-growing fears of the Entente in consequence
created just that fatal competition in armaments and that coalition
policy which burst like a terrible thunderstorm into war.

It was only on the basis of these European fears that the French plans
of revenge developed into action. England would never have drawn the
sword merely for the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine; but the French plan
of revenge was admirably adapted to suit the policy inaugurated by
King Edward, which was derived not from French but from English
motives.

Out of this dread of attack and defence arose that mad fever for
armaments which was characteristic of pre-war times. The race to
possess more soldiers and more guns than one's neighbour was carried
to an absurd extreme. The armaments which the nations had to bear had
become so cumbersome as to be unbearable, and for long it had been
obvious to everyone that the course entered upon could no longer be
pursued, and that two possibilities alone remained--either a voluntary
and general disarmament, or war.

A slight attempt at the first alternative was made in 1912 through
negotiations between Germany and England respecting naval disarmament,