special purpose; by which means the servants in the highest situation,
let their conduct be never so grossly criminal, cannot be removed,
unless the Court of Directors and ministers of the crown can be found to
concur in the same opinion of it. The prevalence of the Indian factions
in the Court of Directors and Court of Proprietors, and sometimes in the
state itself, renders this agreement extremely difficult: if the
principal members of the Direction should be in a conspiracy with any
principal servant under censure, it will be impracticable; because the
first act must originate there. The reduced state of the authority of
this kingdom in Bengal may be traced in a great measure to that very
natural source of independence. In many cases the instant removal of an
offender from his power of doing mischief is the only mode of preventing
the utter and perhaps irretrievable ruin of public affairs. In such a
case the process ought to be simple, and the power absolute in one or in
either hand separately. By contriving the balance of interests formed in
the act, notorious offence, gross error, or palpable insufficiency have
many chances of retaining and abusing authority, whilst the variety of
representations, hearings, and conferences, and possibly the mere
jealousy and competition between rival powers, may prevent any decision,
and at length give time and means for settlements and compromises among
parties, made at the expense of justice and true policy. But this act of
1780, not properly distinguishing judicial process from executive
arrangements, requires in effect nearly the same degree of solemnity,
delay, and detail for removing a political inconvenience which attends a
criminal proceeding for the punishment of offences. It goes further, and
gives the same tenure to all who shall succeed to vacancies which was
given to those whom the act found in office.

[Sidenote: Provisional appointment for vacancies.]