presents, and all the monstrous consequences that followed it.

Now, my Lords, every office of trust, in its very nature, forbids the
receipt of bribes. But Mr. Hastings was forbidden it, first, by his
official situation,--next, by covenant,--and lastly, by act of
Parliament: that is to say, by all the things that bind mankind, or that
can bind them,--first, moral obligation inherent in the duty of their
office,--next, the positive injunctions of the legislature of the
country,--and lastly, a man's own private, particular, voluntary act and
covenant. These three, the great and only obligations that bind mankind,
all united in the focus of this single point,--that they should take no
presents.

I am to mark to your Lordships, that this law and this covenant did
consider indirect ways of taking presents--taking them by others, and
such like--directly in the very same light as they considered taking
them by themselves. It is perhaps a much more dangerous way; because it
adds to the crime a false, prevaricating mode of concealing it, and
makes it much more mischievous by admitting others into the
participation of it. Mr. Hastings has said, (and it is one of the
general complaints of Mr. Hastings,) that he is made answerable for the
acts of other men. It is a thing inherent in the nature of his
situation. All those who enjoy a great superintending trust, which is to
regulate the whole affairs of an empire, are responsible for the acts
and conduct of other men, so far as they had anything to do with
appointing them, or holding them in their places, or having any sort of
inspection into their conduct. But when a Governor presumes to remove
from their situations those persons whom the public authority and
sanction of the Company have appointed, and obtrudes upon them by
violence other persons, superseding the orders of his masters, he