particularly attractive about it in a military sense.

There is evidence to show in an official communiqué from General
Joffre published on August 24, 1914, that it was intended to be
merely the left wing of a gigantic French battle offensive--on
the adopted German plan--from Condé to Belfort. "An army," runs
the communiqué, "advancing from the northern part of the Woevre
and moving on Neufchâteau is attacking the German forces which have
been going through the Duchy of Luxemburg and are on the right bank
of the Samoy. Another army from the region of Sedan is traversing the
Belgian Ardennes and attacking the German forces marching between
the Lesse and the Meuse. A third army from the region of Chimay
has attacked the German right between the Sambre and the Meuse.
It is supported by the English army from the region of Mons."

These attacks comprised chiefly the battle of Dinant and cavalry
skirmishing, but the purpose of General Joffre was otherwise made
plain in throwing advance French troops across the Belgian frontier
into Ligny and Gembloux on the road to a recapture of Brussels.
This we have previously noted in another connection. The rout of
the French army in Lorraine, however, put an end to the grand
Condé-Belfort offensive.

Thus the Namur-Condé line became a main defensive position instead
of an offensive left wing sweep through Belgium upon Germany. As
such it was well enough--if its pivot on the fortress of Namur
held secure. Liege had already proved its vulnerability, but it
would seem that the French General Staff joined with General Michel,
the Commander of Namur, in believing the Namur forts would give
a better account. The French General Staff were informed of the