an army of battle strength.

We have thus two factors to bear in mind with regard to the French
defensive position at Charleroi--the resisting power of the Namur
forts, and the unknown, to the French, proximity of Von Hausen's
army.

However substantial was the measure of reliance that the French
General Staff and General Michel placed on the Namur forts, evidently
General von Bülow regarded them as little more than passing targets
for his siege guns. He seemed to have made a comparatively simple
mathematical calculation of almost the number of shells necessary
to fire, and the hours to be consumed in reducing the Namur forts
to masses of débris.

We can picture General von Bülow as he sat in the motor car with
Marshal von der Goltz--the old gentleman with an overcoat buttoned
up to his nose in August, and huge spectacles. Doubtless discussion
ran mainly upon the impending attack of their Second Army on the
French right. Emphasis would have been laid on the positions of
the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and crown prince advancing
away to their left upon the forces of the French Generals Ruffey
and de Cary. But there was apparently a German gap here between
Von Bülow's army and the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and
crown prince, though we noticed previously Von Bülow's army came
in touch with Saxon troops half way between Huy and Namur, when a
detachment of Von Bülow's left wing was thrown across the Meuse at
Ardenne. This gap was faced by the French extreme right resting on
the southward Namur bend of the Meuse. It was possibly the "trap"
military critics of the moment foresaw for the Germans. Quite likely