course of the Parliament, and not by the Civil Law, nor yet by the
common laws of this realm used in more inferior courts." And after
founding himself on this very precedent of the 11th of Richard II., he
adds, _"This is the reason that Judges ought not to give any opinion of
a matter of Parliament, because it is not to be decided by the common
laws, but secundum Legem et Consuetudinem Parliamenti: and so the Judges
in divers Parliaments have confessed!"_[3]


RULE OF PLEADING.

Your Committee do not find that any rules of pleading, as observed in
the inferior courts, have ever obtained in the proceedings of the High
Court of Parliament, in a cause or matter in which the whole procedure
has been within their original jurisdiction. Nor does your Committee
find that any demurrer or exception, as of false or erroneous pleading,
hath been ever admitted to any impeachment in Parliament, as not coming
within the form of the pleading; and although a reservation or protest
is made by the defendant (matter of form, as we conceive) "to the
generality, uncertainty, and insufficiency of the articles of
impeachment," yet no objections have in fact been ever made in any part
of the record; and when verbally they have been made, (until this
trial,) they have constantly been overruled.

The trial of Lord Strafford[4] is one of the most important eras in the
history of Parliamentary judicature. In that trial, and in the
dispositions made preparatory to it, the process on impeachments was, on
great consideration, research, and selection of precedents, brought very
nearly to the form which it retains at this day; and great and important
parts of Parliamentary Law were then laid down. The Commons at that time