and enlivened with opposite thoughts, and diversified by figures,
otherwise nothing will be more disagreeable than a mere cursory
repetition, which would seem to show distrust of the judge's memory.


RULES FOR THE PERORATION

This seems to be the only kind of peroration allowed by most of the
Athenians and by almost all the philosophers who left anything written
on the art of oratory. The Athenians, I suppose, were of that opinion
because it was customary at Athens to silence, by the public crier, any
orator who should attempt to move the passions. I am less surprized at
this opinion among philosophers, every perturbation of the mind being
considered by them as vicious; nor did it seem to them compatible with
sound morality to divert the judge from truth, nor agreeable to the idea
of an honest man to have recourse to any sinister stratagem. Yet moving
the passions will be acknowledged necessary when truth and justice can
not be otherwise obtained and when public good is concerned in the
decision. All agree that recapitulation may also be employed to
advantage in other parts of the pleading, if the cause is complicated
and requires many arguments to defend it, and, on the other hand, it
will admit of no doubt that many causes are so short and simple as to
have no occasion in any part of them for recapitulation. The above rules
for the peroration apply equally to the accuser and to the defendant's
advocate.

They, likewise, use nearly the same passions, but the accuser more
seldom and more sparingly, and the defendant oftener and with greater
emotions; for it is the business of the former to stir up aversion,
indignation, and other similar passions in the minds of the judges, and