lawyer."--"Certainly," said he, "if there _be_ such a character as a
great lawyer. What thing of importance that only a great lawyer could
do, did not Follett do? He _necessarily_ knew an immensity of law; and
his tact was a thing quite wonderful. I was a great admirer of
Follett.... I once heard him say, by the way, that either he had applied
for the place of a police magistrate, or would have accepted it, if it
had been offered, soon after he had come to the bar; so that it is quite
a mistake to suppose that he was all at once so successful.... And I can
tell you another little fact about Follett: though perhaps no man took
so few notes on his brief, during a cause: this was not always so; for,
when he first came to the bar, he took most full and elaborate notes of
every case, and prepared his arguments with extreme care. I have seen
proofs of this." Shortly before his leaving town, he purchased a copy of
Thirlwall's (the Bishop of St. David's) History of Greece, in eight
volumes, "to read over at the sea-side;" and he did so: telling me that
"he liked it much,--that it had told him many things which he had not
known before." This copy his brother presented to me after Mr. Smith's
death, and I value it greatly. One morning I found him much exhausted;
but soon after I had taken my seat, he said, "You can oblige me by
something, if you will do it for me. I recollect that there is generally
lying on your table, at chambers, 'Bell's Principles of the Law of
Scotland.' Now I am very anxious to read the book, as I expect to be in
one, if not two, Scotch appeal cases, in the House of Lords, next
session!--Will you do me this favour?" Of course I immediately procured
the book to be forwarded to him, and it afforded him uncommon pleasure
for many days. He read it entirely through with deep attention, as his
numerous pencil marks on the margin attest, as well as several notes on
the fly-leaf, of leading points of difference between our law and that
of Scotland. At page 35, §76, the text runs thus:--"Tacit acceptance may
be inferred from silence, when the refusal is so put as to require