Women have the same interest that men have in the establishment and
maintenance of good government; they are to the same extent as men
bound to obey the laws; they suffer to the same extent by bad laws, and
profit to the same extent by good laws; and upon principles of equal
justice, as it would seem, should be allowed equally with men, to
express their preference in the choice of law-makers and rulers. But
however that may be, no greater _absurdity_, to use no harsher term,
could be presented, than that of rewarding men and punishing women, for
the same act, _without giving to women any voice in the question which
should be rewarded, and which punished_.

I am aware, however, that we are here to be governed by the Constitution
and laws as they are, and that if the defendant has been guilty of
violating the law, she must submit to the penalty, however unjust or
absurd the law may be. But courts are not required to so interpret laws
or constitutions as to produce either absurdity or injustice, so long as
they are open to a more reasonable interpretation. This must be my
excuse for what I design to say in regard to the propriety of female
suffrage, because with that propriety established there is very little
difficulty in finding sufficient warrant in the constitution for its
exercise.

This case, in its legal aspects, presents three questions, which I
purpose to discuss.

1. Was the defendant legally entitled to vote at the election in
question?

2. If she was not entitled to vote, but believed that she was, and voted
in good faith in that belief, did such voting constitute a crime under