laws of that great empire, would they subject their female children to
torture with bandaged feet, through the whole period of childhood and
growth, in order that they might be cripples for the residue of their
lives?

If Hindoo women could have shaped the laws of India, would widows for
ages have been burned on the funeral pyres of their deceased husbands?

If Jewish women had had a voice in framing Jewish laws, would the
husband, at his own pleasure, have been allowed to "write his wife a
bill of divorcement and give it in her hand, and send her out of his
house?"

Would women in Turkey or Persia have made it a heinous, if not capital,
offence for a wife to be seen abroad with her face not covered by an
impenetrable veil?

Would women in England, however learned, have been for ages subjected to
execution for offences for which men, who could read, were only
subjected to burning in the hand and a few months imprisonment?

The principle which governs in these cases, or which has done so
hitherto, has been at all times and everywhere the same. Those who
succeed in obtaining power, no matter by what means, will, with rare
exceptions, use it for their exclusive benefit. Often, perhaps
generally, this is done in the honest belief that such use is for the
best good of all who are affected by it. A wrong, however, to those upon
whom it is inflicted, is none the less a wrong by reason of the good
motives of the party by whom it is inflicted.