synonymous terms, and mean the same thing; they describe the _political
body, who, according to our republican institutions, form the
sovereignty and hold the power, and conduct the government through their
representatives_. They are what we familiarly call the sovereign people,
and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of
this sovereignty."

Mr. Justice Daniel, in the same case, (p. 476), says: "Upon the
principles of etymology alone, the term citizen, as derived from
_civitas_, conveys the idea of connection or identification with the
state or government, and a participation in its functions. But beyond
this, there is not, it is believed, to be found in the theories of
writers on government, or in any actual experiment heretofore tried, an
exposition of the term citizen, which has not been understood as
conferring the actual possession and enjoyment, or the perfect right of
acquisition and enjoyment of _an entire equality of privileges, civil
and political_."

Similar references might be made to an indefinite extent, but enough has
been said to show that the term citizen, in the language of Mr. Justice
Daniel, conveys the idea "of identification with the state or
government, and a participation in its functions."

Beyond question, therefore, the first section of the fourteenth
amendment, by placing the citizenship of women upon a par with that of
men, and declaring that the "privileges and immunities" of the citizen
shall not be abridged, has secured to women, equally with men, the right
of suffrage, unless that conclusion is overthrown by some other
provision of the constitution.