qualification in a voter for a representative in Congress than is
required for a voter for a Member of Assembly, this would, I conceive,
be a violation of a right belonging to one as a citizen of the United
States. That right is in relation to a Federal subject or interest, and
is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The inability of a State to
abridge the right of voting on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude, arises from a Federal guaranty. Its violation
would be the denial of a Federal right--that is a right belonging to the
claimant as a citizen of the United States.

This right, however, exists by virtue of the 15th Amendment. If the 15th
Amendment had contained the word "sex," the argument of the defendant
would have been potent. She would have said, an attempt by a State to
deny the right to vote because one is of a particular sex, is expressly
prohibited by that Amendment. The amendment, however, does not contain
that word. It is limited to race, color, or previous condition of
servitude. The Legislature of the State of New York has seen fit to say,
that the franchise of voting shall be limited to the male sex. In saying
this, there is, in my judgment, no violation of the letter or of the
spirit of the 14th or of the 15th Amendment. This view is assumed in the
second section of the 14th Amendment, which enacts that if the right to
vote for Federal officers is denied by any state to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, except for crime, the basis of representation
of such State shall be reduced in proportion specified. Not only does
this section assume that the right of male inhabitants to vote was the
especial object of its protection, but it assumes and admits the right
of a State, notwithstanding the existence of that clause under which the
defendant claims to the contrary, to deny to classes or portions of the
male inhabitants the right to vote which is allowed to other male
inhabitants. The regulation of the suffrage is thereby conceded to the