examined as a witness in her behalf, and testified that he gave her such
advice, and that he gave it in good faith, believing that she had such
right.

It also appeared that when she offered to vote, the question whether as
a woman she had a right to vote, was raised by the inspectors, and
considered by them in her presence, and they decided that she had a
right to vote, and received her vote accordingly.

It was also shown on the part of the government, that on the examination
of the defendant before the commissioner, on whose warrant she was
arrested, she stated that she should have voted, if allowed to vote,
without reference to the advice she had received from the attorney whose
opinion she had asked; that she was not influenced to vote by that
opinion; that she had before determined to offer her vote, and had no
doubt about her right to vote.

At the close of the testimony the defendant's counsel proceeded to
address the jury, and stated that he desired to present for
consideration three propositions, two of law and one of fact:

First--That the defendant had a lawful right to vote.

Second--That whether she had a lawful right to vote or not, it she
honestly believed that she had that right and voted in good faith in
that belief, she was guilty of no crime.

Third--That when she gave her vote she gave it in good faith, believing
that it was her right to do so.