but a friend has referred me to an authority strongly supporting my
position, from which I will quote, though I deem a reference to
precedents unnecessary to sustain the plain declarations of the
Constitution: I refer to the case of the _State vs. Shule_, (_10
Iredell, 153_,) the substance of which is stated in _2 Graham &
Waterman_ on New Trials, page 363. Before stating that case I quote from
the text of G. & W.

"The verdict is to be the result of the deliberation of the jury
upon all the evidence in the case. The Court has no right to
anticipate the verdict by an expression of opinion calculated so to
influence the jury as to take from them their independence of
action."

In the _State vs. Shule_, two defendants were indicted for an affray.
"The jury remaining out a considerable time, at the request of the
prosecuting attorney they were sent for by the Court. The Court then
charged them that although Jones, (the other defendant,) had first
commenced a battery upon Shule, yet, if the jury believed the evidence,
the defendant, Shule, was also guilty. Thereupon, one of the jurors
remarked that they had agreed to convict Jones, but were about to acquit
Shule. The Court then charged the jury again, and told them that they
could retire if they thought proper to do so. The jury consulted
together a few minutes in the Court room. The prosecuting attorney
directed the clerk to enter a verdict of guilty as to both defendants.
When the clerk had entered the verdict, the jury were asked to attend to
it, as it was about to be read by the clerk. The clerk then read the
verdict in the hearing of the jury. The jury, upon being requested, if
any of them disagreed to the verdict to make, it known by a nod, seemed
to express their unanimous assent; and no juror expressed his dissent."