contention being that it is not favorably located from a strategic point
of view, and that, owing to bars in the Cooper River, up which it is
situated, it cannot be entered by large ships. The point is also made
that while labor is cheaper at this yard than at any other, skilled
metal-workers are hard to get. Friends of the yard contend, upon the
other hand, that it is desirable because of its convenience to the
Caribbean Sea, where, according to naval theory, this country will some
day have to fight a battle in defense of the Panama Canal. The Pensacola
yard, it is pointed out, is exposed and can be bombarded, whereas the
Charleston yard is far enough inland to be safe from sea attack. As to
the channel, it is navigable for destroyers and other small
craft--though whether it would be so to a large destroyer which had been
injured and was drawing more water than usual, I do not know. The
practical situation of the navy, with regard to this and some of the
other political yards, is like that of some man who has been left a lot
of heterogeneous houses, scattered about town, none of them suited to
his purposes, and who is obliged to scatter his family amongst them as
best he can, or else abandon them and build a new house. We have been
following the former course, and are only now preparing to adopt the
latter, by establishing a naval base at Norfolk, as mentioned in an
earlier chapter.

Charleston politics have been peculiar. Until a few years ago the
government of the city had long rested in the hands of a few old
families, among them the Gadsdens and the Rhetts. The overthrow of this
ancient and aristocratic rule by the election to the mayoralty of John
P. Grace, an alleged "friend of the people," was spoken of by the New
York "Sun," as being not a mere change in municipal government, but the
fall of a dynasty which had controlled the city politically, financially
and socially for a century and a half. Mr. Grace may be dismissed with