in the past, in its origin and through long ages, had been waged with
vessels moved by oars, which consequently, when conditions permitted
engaging at all, could be handled with a scope and freedom not securable
with the uncertain factor of the wind. The motive power of the sea,
therefore, then resembled essentially that of the land,--being human
muscle and staying power, in the legs on shore and in the arms at sea.
Hence, movements by masses, by squadrons, and in any desired direction
corresponding to a fixed plan, in order to concentrate, or to
outflank,--all these could be attempted with a probability of success
not predicable of the sailing ship. Nelson's remarkable order at
Trafalgar, which may almost be said to have closed and sealed the record
of the sail era, began by assuming the extreme improbability of being
able at any given moment to move forty ships of his day in a fixed order
upon an assigned plan. The galley admiral therefore wielded a weapon far
more flexible and reliable, within the much narrower range of its
activities, than his successor in the days of sail; and engagements
between fleets of galleys accordingly reflected this condition, being
marked not only by greater carnage, but by tactical combinations and
audacity of execution, to which the sailing ship did not so readily lend
itself.

When the field of naval warfare became extended beyond the
Mediterranean,--for long centuries its principal scene,--the galley no
longer met the more exacting nautical conditions; and the introduction
of cannon, involving new problems of tactics and ship-building,
accelerated its disappearance. The traditions of galley-fighting,
however, remained, and were reinforced by the habits of land
fighting,--the same men in fact commanding armies on shore and fleets at
sea. In short, a period of transition ensued, marked, as such in their
beginnings are apt to be, by an evident lack of clearness in men's