miles through the straggling of the rear. Lestock's ship was six
miles from that of Mathews, whereas it should not have been more than
two and a half, at most, in ordinary sailing; for battle, the
Instructions allowed little over a half-mile. Accepting the Court's
finding that he was in position at dark, this distance can only be
attributed, as Lestock argued and the Court admitted, to a current--that
most convenient of scape-goats in navigation. The allies, too, had a
lagging rear body, five Spanish ships being quite a distance astern; but
from van to rear they extended but six miles, against the British nine.
It was the distance of the British rear, not straggling in van or
centre, that constituted this disadvantage.

Mathews wished to wait till Lestock reached his place, but the allies
were receding all the time; and, though their pace was slackened to
enable the five sternmost Spaniards to come up, the space between the
fleets was increasing. It was the duty of the British admiral to force
an action, on general principles; but in addition he believed that the
French intended to push for Gibraltar, enter the Atlantic, and join
their Brest fleet, in order to cover an invasion of England by an army
reported to be assembling at Dunkirk. Clearly, therefore, something must
be done; yet to enter into a general engagement with near a third of his
command out of immediate supporting distance was contrary to the
accepted principles of the day. The fleet was not extended with that of
the enemy, by which is meant that the respective vans, centres, and
rears were not opposed; the British van being only abreast of the allied
centre, their centre of the allied rear, Lestock tailing away astern and
to windward, while the dozen leading French were some distance ahead of
both bodies. Now the Fighting Instructions required that, "If the
admiral and his fleet have the wind of the enemy, and they have
stretched themselves in a line of battle, the van of the admiral's fleet