that he could do so with safety. To this he rejoined, with a curtness
that testifies to the uneasiness of his mind, "I did not send for you to
ask your opinions, but only to observe that not one of our ships is
coming down to my assistance, in order to cut those five sail off, and
in case those five sail should oblige me to haul my wind again, and
leave the _Marlborough_, that you may be able to indemnify my conduct,
if called in question." One witness also testified that he "was angry
that Admiral Lestock's division did not bear down,"--which was just
enough,--and that "he thought it most advisable to keep his station;"
meaning by this, apparently, to remain where he was. His
cross-examination of the evidence was directed to prove the danger to
his ship from these remaining Spaniards. This anxiety was wholly
misplaced, and professionally unworthy. Quite independent of orders by
signal and message, he was bound, in view of the condition of the
_Marlborough_, to go to her relief, and to assume that the three English
ships of the centre division, in his rear, would surely sustain him. To
base contrary action upon a doubt of their faithfulness was to condemn
himself. Four ships to five under such conditions should be rather a
spur than a deterrent to an officer of spirit, who understands the
obligation of his calling.

Till this, the _Dorsetshire_ had been under her three topsails only. She
appears then to have stood down under more sail, but very slowly, and
here occurred another disaster which was largely chargeable to her being
out of her station. Seeing the desperate state of the _Marlborough_,
Mathews, who throughout managed blunderingly, with the single exception
of the original attack, had thought to aid her and divert the fire of
the _Real_ by sending against the latter a fire-ship. It was elementary
that vessels of this class needed energetic support and cover in their
desperate work. Small in size, of no battery-force except against boat