demonstration of practical disaster attending false theory; but, while
the tactical inefficiency was little less, the evidence of faint-hearted
professional incompetency, of utter personal inadequacy, was at least
not so glaring. It is the combination of the two in the person of the
same commander that has given to this action its pitiful pre-eminence in
the naval annals of the century.

It is, therefore, not so much to point out the lesson, as to reinforce
its teaching by the exemplification of the practical results, that there
is advantage in tracing the sequel of events in this battle. The signal
to tack was made when the British van had reached beyond the enemy's
rear, at a very little after 1 P.M. (B3). This reversed the line of
battle, the rear becoming the van, on the port tack. When done, the new
van was about two miles from that of the French (F4); the new rear,
in which Byng was fourth from sternmost, was three and a half or four
from their rear. Between this and 2 P.M. came the signals for the ship
then leading to keep two points, twenty-five degrees, more to starboard,
--towards the enemy; a measure which could only have the bad effect of
increasing the angle which the British line already made with that of
the French, and the consequent inequality of distance to be traversed by
their vessels in reaching their opponents. At 2.20 the signal for battle
was made, and was repeated by the second in command, Rear-Admiral Temple
West, who was in the fourth ship from the van. His division of six bore
up at once and ran straight down before the wind, under topsails only,
for their several antagonists; the sole exception being the van-most
vessel, which took the slanting direction desired by Byng, with the
consequence that she got ahead of her position, had to back and to wear
to regain it, and was worse punished than any of her comrades. The
others engaged in line, within point-blank, the rear-admiral hoisting
the flag for close action (B4). Fifteen minutes later, the sixth ship,