The French rear with its commander-in-chief had been watching the
incidents narrated: the crippling of the _Intrepid_, the consequent
disorder in the British rear, and the increasing distance between it and
the van. When the _Revenge_, however, passed ahead, and Byng
disentangled his flag-ship, the moment for a decisive step arrived. The
French rear vessels were nearer the British van than Byng's division
was. They now filled their topsails, made more sail, stood for the
British leading ships, already partially unrigged, passed by, and in so
doing gave them the fire of a number of substantially fresh vessels,
which had undergone only a distant and ineffective cannonade. Byng saw
what was about to happen, and also set more canvas; but it was no longer
possible to retrieve the preceding errors. The French admiral had it in
his power very seriously to damage, if not to destroy the hostile van;
but in accordance with the tradition of his nation he played an
over-prudent game, strictly defensive, and kept too far off. After
exchanging distant broadsides, he steered northwest towards Mahon,
satisfied that he had for the time disabled his opponent. The British
that evening tacked off-shore and stood to the southeast. Four days
later they abandoned the field, returning to Gibraltar. The fall of
Minorca followed.

Nothing could have been much worse than the deplorable management of
this action on the part of the commander-in-chief. It is a conspicuous
instance of weak and halting execution, superimposed upon a professional
conception radically erroneous; and it reflected throughout the timid
hesitancy of spirit which dictated the return to Gibraltar, under the
always doubtful sanction of a Council of War. But the historical value
of the lesson is diminished if attention is confined to the shortcomings
of the admiral, neglectful of the fact that his views as to the
necessity to observe the routine of the Fighting Instructions are