world over, throw the business of the Kaiser's country smack into the
lap of the United States? Sober reflection over these possibilities may
stay economic reprisal.

On the other hand, there are many ways by which even a near translation
of the economic pact into actuality may work hardship--even disaster--to
American commercial interests. No matter which way we turn when peace
comes we shall face the proverbial millstones in the shape of two great
alliances. One is the Allied Group, jealous of our new wealth and world
power, bitter with the belief that we have coined gold out of agony; the
other is the Teutonic Union, smarting because of our aid to its
enemies, stinging under reverses, mad with a desire to recuperate.

Examine our trade relations with warring Europe and you see how
hazardous a shift in old-time relations would be. To the fighting
peoples and their colonies in normal times we send nearly seventy-eight
per cent of our exports, and from them we derive seventy per cent of our
exports. The Allies alone, principally England and her colonies, get
sixty-three per cent of these exports and send us fifty-four per cent of
all we get from foreign lands.

As the National Foreign-Trade Council of the United States points out:
"Any sweeping change of tariff, navigation or financial policy on the
part of either group of the Allies, and particularly on the part of the
Entente Allies, may seriously affect the domestic prosperity of the
United States, in which foreign trade is a vital element."

Why is this foreign trade so vital? Because, during these last two years
of world upheaval we have rolled up the immense favourable trade balance
of over three billion dollars. In peace time this would be paid for in