here. If there were any, it would be in London that they would first
become common knowledge. But if such an offensive ever does happen, have
the British people any idea of its difficulties? In this warfare, when
you have brought up such artillery as was unbelievable even in the
first year of the war, and reduced miles of trenches to powder, and have
walked over the line of the works in front of you, a handful of batmen
and Headquarters' cooks may still hold up the greatest attack yet
delivered, and you may spend the next month dashing your strength away
against a barrier of ever-increasing toughness.

If an offensive ever is made, we know it will not be made without good
reason for its success. But everything which one has seen points to the
conclusion that a vague belief in the success of such an offensive ought
not to be the sole mental effort that a great part of the nation makes
towards winning the war. And yet, from what I saw lately during a recent
visit to Great Britain, I should say that such was the case. "If we fail
to break through," the public says, "surely the Russians will manage it,
or the French will succeed this time." Wherever we have seen the war
there is always this tendency to look elsewhere for success. There is
not the slightest doubt we have success in our power. The game is in our
hands if we will only play it. The talk about our resources and staying
power is not all "hot air," as the Americans say. The resources were
there, and it was always known that in the later stages of the war,
when Germany and our Allies who entered the war at final strength, had
used most of their resources, then those of Britain would become
decisive because she had not yet used them. That stage we are reaching
now--Britain's resources measured against those of Germany. We have the
advantage in entering it. The danger is that while we squander our
wealth without organisation, the German, by bringing all his brains and
resolution to bear on the problem, may so eke out his strained resources