never been withdrawn. The one moral act goes on, and but one sin is
committed.

Thus, of two wretches on the same errand of crime, one may sin but
once, while the other is guilty of the same sin a number of times. But
the several sins last no longer than the one. Which is the more guilty?
That is a question for God to decide; He does the judging, we do the
counting.

This possible multiplication of sin where a single act is apparent
emphasizes the fact that evil and good proceed from the will. It is by
the will primarily and essentially that we serve or offend God, and,
absolutely speaking, no exterior deed is necessary for the
accomplishment of this end.

The exterior deed of sin always supposes a natural preparation of sin--
thought, desires, resolution,--which precede or accompany the deed, and
without which there would be no sin. It is sinful only inasmuch as it
is related to the will, and is the fruit thereof. The interior act
constitutes the sin in its being; the exterior act constitutes it in
its completeness.

All of which leads up to the conclusion, of a nature perhaps to
surprise some, that to resolve to sin and to commit the sin in deed are
not two different sins, but one complete sin, in all the fulness of its
malice. True, the exterior act may give rise to scandal, and from it
may devolve upon us obligations of justice, the reparation of injury
done; true, with the exterior complement the sin may be more grievous.
But there cannot be several sins if there be one single uninterrupted
act of the will.