real estate; if it is right and wise to take the one in perpetuity, it
is equally so to take the other. In our judgment, it is right and wise
to do both.


MILITARY ADMINISTRATION--NO ARMY OF RESERVE.

In looking over the war, we can all now see a very great error in the
_military_ administration--the neglect, namely, to provide and keep up
a proper reserved force. It is the grand mistake of the war. Two years
and a half of war, and no army of reserve! Eighteen months ago, a force
of reserve of at least two hundred thousand men should have been formed.
It could probably then have been formed of volunteers. From it,
vacancies made in the armies in the field by battle, disease, or
expiration of time of service, could have been filled with drilled and
disciplined soldiers, and reinforcements drawn to meet any special
exigency. The victory of Gettysburgh might have resulted in the total
destruction of Lee's army before he could recross the Potomac; and
Rosecrans might have been strengthened without weakening the Army of the
Potomac or any other. Whether the cost of forming and keeping up such a
force of reserve would have greatly exceeded the cost of the recent
draft, we do not pretend to know. We are inclined to think it would not.
But that is a question of little moment. Money wisely spent is well
spent: money unwisely saved is ill saved. With such a force, the recent
draft might not have been necessary--at all events there would have been
no necessity for suspending active military operations in Virginia, and
awaiting the slow completion of the draft, at a moment when, large
additions to the forces in the field were precisely the one thing
needful. The army of reserve would at once have supplied disciplined
soldiers, and their places in the camps of instruction and reserve could