surprising that John Lewis, in his closely reasoned book, _The Case
Against Pacifism_, bases his whole attack on the logic of the pacifist
position upon the theory that pacifists _must_, as he does, hold other
values above their respect for individual human personalities. Even in
speaking of "absolute" pacifism he says, "The most fundamental objection
to war is based on the conviction that violence and the taking of human
life, being themselves wrong, cannot lead to anything but evil."[7] Thus
he defines the absolute pacifist as one who accepts the ends and means
argument of Huxley, which is really an argument based upon expediency,
rather than defining him correctly as one who insists that violence and
the taking of human life are the greatest evils, under any conditions,
and therefore cannot be justified, even if they could be used for the
achievement of highly desirable ends.

Maintaining as Lewis does that respect for every human personality is
not their highest value, non-pacifists attack pacifism almost entirely
on the ground that in the present state of world society it is not
expedient--that it is "impractical." Probably much of the pacifist
defense of the position is designed to meet these non-pacifist
arguments, and to persuade non-pacifists of goodwill that they can
really best serve _their_ highest values by adopting the pacifist
technique. Such reasoning is perfectly legitimate, even for the
"absolutist," but he should recognize it for what it is--a mere
afterthought to his acceptance of non-violence as a principle.

The whole absolutist argument is this: (1) Since violence to any human
personality is the greatest evil, I can never commit it. (2) But, at the
same time, it is fortunate that non-violent means of overcoming evil are
more effective than violent means, so I can serve my highest
value--respect for every human personality--and at the same time serve