the strikers to arrive at a settlement. If the employer does feel that
the principle of control of an enterprise by its owner is at stake, he
may hold out longer, until he actually loses more by the strike than he
would by conceding the demands of the strikers, but even then he
balances psychological cost against monetary cost, and when the latter
overweighs the former he becomes receptive to a settlement.

During the strike the workers are going through much the same process. A
strike from their point of view is even more costly than it is to the
employer. It is not to be entered upon lightly, since their very means
of sustenance are at stake. They too have to balance the monetary costs
of their continued refusal to cooperate against the gains that they
might hope for by continued resistance, and when the cost becomes
greater than the prospective gain they are receptive to suggestions for
compromise. They too may be contending for the principle of the right of
organization and control over their own economic destinies, so that they
may be willing to suffer loss for a longer period than they would if
they stood to gain only the immediate monetary advantages, but when
immediate costs more than overweigh ultimate psychological advantages,
they too will be willing to capitulate.

In the meantime the strikers have to see to it that the employer does
not find someone else with whom he can cooperate in order to eliminate
his dependence upon them. Hence they picket the plant, in an attempt to
persuade others not to work there. If persuasion is not effective, they
may resort to mass picketing, which amounts to a threat of violence
against the persons who would attempt to take over their jobs. On
occasion the threat to their jobs becomes so great that in order to
defend them they will resort to violence against the strikebreaker. At
this point, the public, which is apt to be somewhat sympathetic toward