German object, which naturally included the taking of Verdun, was to
hammer at the heart of French defense until France, staggering under the
blows, her _morale_ broken by the loss of the fortress, her supposedly
mercurial nature in the depths of depression, would surrender to
impulse and ask for terms.

After the German attacks began at Verdun all the world was asking why
the British, who were holding only sixty-odd miles of line at the time
and must have large reserves, did not rush to the relief of the French.
The French people themselves were a little restive under what was
supposed to be British inaction. Army leaders could not reveal their
plans by giving reasons--the reasons which are now obvious--for their
action or inaction. To some unmilitary minds the situation seemed as
simple as if Jones were attacked on the street by Smith and Robinson,
while Miller, Jones' friend who was a block away, would not go to his
rescue. To others, perhaps a trifle more knowing, it seemed only a
matter of marching some British divisions across country or putting them
on board a train.

Of course the British were only too ready to assist the French. Any
other attitude would have been unintelligent; for, with the French Army
broken, the British Army would find itself having to bear unassisted the
weight of German blows in the West. There were three courses which the
British Army might take.

_First._ It could send troops to Verdun. But the mixture of units
speaking different languages in the intricate web of communications
required for directing modern operations, and the mixture of transport
in the course of heavy concentrations in the midst of a critical action
where absolute cohesion of all units was necessary, must result in