will, is from an affection of some love. Who can wish to know or to
understand anything except that an affection of his takes pleasure in it?
Who can feel this pleasure unless what he is affected by seems to be his?
Were it not his, but another's altogether, that is, if another from his
affection should infuse something into his mind when he himself felt no
affection for knowing or grasping it, would he receive it? Indeed, could
he receive it? Would he not be like one called a dullard or a clod?

[2] It should be manifest then that although everything that a man
perceives, thinks, knows and, according to perception, wills and does,
flows into him, nevertheless it is of the Lord's divine providence that
it seems to be the man's. Otherwise, as we said, a man would not receive
anything and so could be given no intelligence or wisdom. It is known
that all good and truth are the Lord's and not man's, and yet appear to
be man's. As good and truth so appear, so do all things of the church and
of heaven, and all things of love and wisdom, and all things of charity
and faith; yet none of them is man's. No one can receive them from the
Lord unless it seems to him that he perceives them for himself. Plainly,
the truth of the matter is that whatever a man does in freedom, whether
with reason or not, provided only that it accords with his reason, seems
to him to be his.

77. Who cannot from his faculty called rationality understand that a
given good is serviceable to society, and a given evil harmful to
society? That, for example, justice, sincerity, the chastity of marriage
are serviceable to it, and injustice, insincerity, and misconduct with
the wives of others, harmful? Consequently that these evils are in
themselves injuries, and those goods in themselves benefits? Who then
cannot make this a matter of his reason if only he will? He has
rationality and he has liberty; the two faculties are bared, show, take