peace and welfare of the community of nations. Washington did not
object to temporary alliances for special emergencies nor did Jefferson
object to special alliances for the accomplishment of definite objects.
Their advice has, however, been generally interpreted as meaning that
the United States must hold aloof from world politics and attend
strictly to its own business.

The Monroe Doctrine was a perfectly sound principle and it has been
fully justified by nearly a century of experience. It has saved South
America from the kind of exploitation to which the continents of Africa
and Asia have, during the past generation, fallen a prey. The policy
of isolation, on the other hand, still cherished by so many Americans
as a sacred tradition of the fathers, is in principle quite distinct
from the Monroe Doctrine and is in fact utterly inconsistent with the
position and importance of the United States as a world power. The
difference in principle between the two policies can perhaps best be
illustrated by the following supposition. If the United States were to
sign a permanent treaty with England placing our navy at her disposal
in the event of attack from Germany or some other power, on condition
that England would unite with us in opposing the intervention of any
European power in Latin America, such a treaty would not be a violation
of the Monroe Doctrine, but a distinct recognition of that principle.
Such a treaty would, however, be a departure from our traditional
policy of isolation. Of the two policies, that of avoiding political
alliances is the older. It was announced by Washington under
circumstances that will be considered in a moment.

In the struggle for independence the colonies deliberately sought
foreign alliances. In fact, the first treaty ever signed by the United
States was the treaty of alliance with France, negotiated and ratified