that nothing could well be added. He says:

'It is an error to suppose that the increase of prices is
attributable wholly or in very large measure to this circulation.
Had it been possible to borrow coin enough, and fast enough, for
the disbursements of the war, almost if not altogether the same
effects on prices would have been wrought. Such disbursements made
in coin would have enriched fortunate contractors, stimulated
lavish expenditures, and so inflated prices in the same way and
nearly to the same extent as when made in notes. Prices, too, would
have risen from other causes. The withdrawal from mechanical and
agricultural occupations of hundreds of thousands of our best,
strongest, and most active workers, in obedience to their country's
summons to the field, would, under any system of currency, have
increased the price of labor, and, by consequence, the price of the
products of labor,' &c.

It is impossible to deny the force of this statement; and upon the whole
we must acknowledge that most of the evils which have been attributed to
the financial policy of the Government were inherent in the very nature
of the situation, and would have developed themselves, more or less,
under any system which could have been adopted. It is very obvious that
they might have been greatly aggravated by slight changes; but it is not
easy to see how they could have been more skilfully met and parried than
by the measures which have actually yielded such brilliant results.

The most signal triumph of Mr. Chase's whole system of finance is to be
found in the truly marvellous success of his favorite five-twenty bonds.
Even at the present time the public enthusiasm for these securities
seems to be unabated, and it is more than probable that the whole amount