universe into order. But in his case they were only to be grouped under
appropriate headings, and, as it were, quietly labeled.

With the author of 'Civilization in England' it was otherwise. In the
_actual_ careers of men and of nations, Facts do not stand related to
each other and to human actions in the distinct and distinguishable way
in which they appear when correlated, as by Comte, in accordance with
general Laws. The domain of the _concrete_, or of practical life, has
always a variable element which does not obtain in the sphere of
generalizing Principles, and which immensely complicates the
investigation of the problems of real existence. Comte purposely
excluded the realm of the _concrete_ from his studies, and therefore
simplified, to a great extent, his field of labor. Yet even in his
attempt to bring order into this curtailed department of inquiry, he
professes, not merely his own inability to accomplish, but his
conviction of the inherent impossibility of the accomplishment of that,
for the _abstract_ only, which Buckle really undertook for the
_concrete_; namely, the reduction of the Phenomena of the Universe to a
single Law; or, what is synonymous, the integration of all the laws of
the moral and physical world into a single Science.

The character of his undertaking compelled Mr. Buckle, on the contrary,
to stretch his mental antennæ into every department of mundane activity,
to hold the Facts there discovered, so far as he might, collectively
within his grasp, and to draw them by an irresistible strain into
gradually decreasing circles of generalization, until they were brought
to a Central Law, which should contain within itself the many-sided
explanation of the intricate ramifications of individual and national
careers. The difference in the work essayed by the two distinguished
Thinkers whose labors we are considering, is somewhat analogous to that