to accept and abide by a fixed and final creed, he does it either for a
reason or without a reason. If he does it without a reason, then there
is, of course, no reason why we should follow his example. If he has a
reason, then two things: either that reason is adequate, sound,
conclusive, or it is not. If it is not adequate, then we ought to study
and criticise and find that out, and be free to discover some reason
that is adequate. If the reason for his holding the creed is an
adequate one, then, certainly, no harm can be done by investigation of
it, by asking questions.

If the men who hold these old creeds and defend them can give in the
court of reason a perfectly good account of themselves, if they can
bring satisfactory credentials, then all our questioning, all our
criticism, all our investigation, cannot possibly do the creeds any
harm. It will only mean that we shall end by being convinced ourselves,
and shall accept the creeds freely and rationally.

It has always seemed to me a very strange attitude of mind for a man to
feel perfectly convinced that a certain position is sound and true, and
to be angry when anybody asks a question about it. If there are good
reasons for holding it, instead of calling names, why not show us the
reasons? He who is afraid to have his opinions questioned, he who is
angry when you ask him for evidence, to give a reason for the position
that he holds, shows that he is not at all certain of it. He admits by
implication that it is weak. He shows an attitude of infidelity instead
of an attitude of faith, of trust.

There is no position which I hold to-day that I consider so sacred that
people are not at liberty to ask any questions about it they please;
and, if they do not see a good reason for accepting it, I am certainly