campaign had been active, and the duties of the American general
uncommonly arduous. The best English writers bestow high encomiums on
Sir William Howe for his military skill, and masterly movements during
this period. At Brandywine especially, Washington is supposed to have
been "outgeneraled, more outgeneraled than in any action during the
war." If all the operations of this trying period be examined, and the
means in possession of both be considered, the American chief will
appear, in no respect, inferior to his adversary, or unworthy of the
high place assigned to him in the opinions of his countrymen. With an
army decidedly inferior, not only in numbers, but in every military
requisite except courage, in an open country, he employed his enemy
near thirty days in advancing about sixty miles. In this time he
fought one general action; and, though defeated, was able to
reassemble the same undisciplined, unclothed, and almost unfed army;
and, the fifth day afterwards, again to offer battle. When the armies
were separated by a storm which involved him in the most distressing
circumstances, he extricated himself from them, and still maintained a
respectable and imposing countenance.

The only advantage he is supposed to have given was at the battle of
Brandywine; and that was produced by the contrariety and uncertainty
of the intelligence received. A general must be governed by his
intelligence, and must regulate his measures by his information. It is
his duty to obtain correct information; and among the most valuable
traits of a military character, is the skill to select those means
which will obtain it. Yet the best selected means are not always
successful; and, in a new army, where military talent has not been
well tried by the standard of experience, the general is peculiarly
exposed to the chance of employing not the best instruments. In a
country, too, which is covered with wood, precise information of the