numbers composing different columns is to be gained with difficulty.

It has been said "that the Americans do not appear to have made all
the use that might be expected of the advantages which the country
afforded for harassing and impeding the British army."

In estimating this objection, it ought to be recollected that General
Smallwood was directed, with the militia of Maryland and Delaware,
supported by a regiment of continental troops, to hang on and harass
the rear of the enemy: that General Maxwell, with a select corps
consisting of a thousand men, was ordered to seize every occasion to
annoy him on his march: that General Wayne, with his division, was
afterwards detached to unite with Smallwood, and command the whole
force collected in the rear, which would have been very respectable.

If the militia did not assemble in the numbers expected, or effect the
service allotted to them, their failure is not attributable to General
Washington. His calls on them had been early and energetic; and the
state of his army did not admit of his making larger detachments from
it to supply the place they had been designed to fill.

Loud complaints had been made against General Maxwell by the officers
of his corps; and a court was ordered to inquire into his conduct, by
whom he was acquitted. Whether that officer omitted to seize the
proper occasions to annoy the enemy, or the cautious and compact
movements of Sir William Howe afforded none, can not be easily
ascertained. General Washington felt the loss of Morgan, and wrote
pressingly to Gates, after his success against Burgoyne, to restore
him that officer, with his regiment, as soon as possible.