Having failed in every attempt to draw the militia of Jersey to the
Delaware, General Washington determined to strengthen the garrison by
farther drafts from his army. Three hundred Pennsylvania militia were
detached, to be divided between the two forts; and, a few days
afterwards, General Varnum was ordered, with his brigade, to take a
position about Woodbury, near Red Bank, and to relieve and reinforce
the garrisons of both forts as far as his strength would permit. The
hope was entertained that the appearance of so respectable a
continental force might encourage the militia to assemble in greater
numbers.

Aware of the advantage to result from a victory over the British army
while separated from the fleet, General Washington had been uniformly
determined to risk much to gain one. He had, therefore, after the
battle of Germantown, continued to watch assiduously for an
opportunity to attack his enemy once more to advantage. The
circumspect caution of General Howe afforded none. After the repulse
at Red Bank, his measures were slow but certain; and were calculated
to insure the possession of the forts without exposing his troops to
the hazard of an assault.

In this state of things, intelligence was received of the successful
termination of the northern campaign, in consequence of which great
part of the troops who had been employed against Burgoyne, might be
drawn to the aid of the army in Pennsylvania. But it was feared that,
before these reinforcements could arrive, Sir William Howe would gain
possession of the forts, and remove the obstructions to the navigation
of the Delaware. This apprehension furnished a strong motive for
vigorous attempts to relieve fort Mifflin. But the relative force of
the armies, the difficulty of acting offensively against Philadelphia,