extending from river to river, and connected by an abattis, and by
circular works. It would be indispensably necessary to carry all these
redoubts; since to leave a part of them to play on the rear of the
columns, while engaged in front with the enemy in Philadelphia, would
be extremely hazardous.

Supposing the redoubts carried, and the British army driven into the
town, yet all military men were agreed on the great peril of storming
a town. The streets would be defended by an artillery greatly superior
to that of the Americans, which would attack in front, while the brick
houses would be lined with musketeers, whose first must thin the ranks
of the assailants.

A part of the plan, on the successful execution of which the whole
depended, was, that the British rear should be surprised by the corps
descending the Delaware. This would require the concurrence of too
many favourable circumstances to be calculated on with any confidence.
As the position of General Greene was known, it could not be supposed
that Sir William Howe would be inattentive to him. It was probable
that not even his embarkation would be made unnoticed; but it was
presuming a degree of negligence which ought not to be assumed, to
suppose that he could descend the river to Philadelphia undiscovered.
So soon as his movements should be observed, the whole plan would be
comprehended, since it would never be conjectured that General Greene
was to attack singly.

If the attack in front should fail, which was not even improbable, the
total loss of the two thousand men in the rear must follow; and
General Howe would maintain his superiority through the winter.