On no former occasion had the two armies met, uncovered by works, with
superior numbers on the side of the Americans. The effective force of
the British was then stated at twelve thousand men. It has been since
declared by an author[76] who then belonged to it, but who, though a
candid writer, appears to have imbibed prejudices against Sir William
Howe, to have amounted to fourteen thousand. The American army
consisted of precisely twelve thousand one hundred and sixty-one
continental troops, and three thousand two hundred and forty-one
militia. This equality in point of numbers, rendered it a prudent
precaution to maintain a superiority of position. As the two armies
occupied heights fronting each other, neither could attack without
giving to its adversary some advantage in the ground; and this was an
advantage which neither seemed willing to relinquish.

[Footnote 76: Stedman.]

The return of Sir William Howe to Philadelphia without bringing on an
action, after marching out with the avowed intention of fighting, is
the best testimony of the respect which he felt for the talents of his
adversary, and the courage of the troops he was to encounter.

The cold was now becoming so intense that it was impossible for an
army neither well clothed, nor sufficiently supplied with blankets,
longer to keep the field in tents. It had become necessary to place
the troops in winter quarters; but in the existing state of things the
choice of winter quarters was a subject for serious reflection. It was
impossible to place them in villages without uncovering the country,
or exposing them to the hazard of being beaten in detachment.

To avoid these calamities, it was determined to take a strong position