The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation - Annotations of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 30, 1952 by Unknown
page 141 of 2517 (05%)
page 141 of 2517 (05%)
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Justice Sutherland suggests, directly affect "the internal affairs" of
the nation; they touch principally its peripheral relations, as it were. The most serious inroads on the doctrine of enumerated powers are, in fact, those which have taken place under cover of the doctrine--the vast expansion in recent years of national legislative power in the regulation of commerce among the States and in the expenditure of the national revenues; and verbally at least Marshall laid the ground for these developments in some of the phraseology above quoted from his opinion in McCulloch _v._ Maryland. Nondelegability of Legislative Power ORIGIN OF DOCTRINE At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the principle that legislative power cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine of separation of powers: Why go to the trouble of separating the three powers of government if they can straightway remerge on their own motion? The second is the concept of due process of law, which precludes the transfer of regulatory functions to private persons. Lastly, there is the maxim of agency "_Delegata potestas non potest delegari_," which John Locke borrowed and formulated as a dogma of political science.[19] In Hampton Jr. & Co. _v._ United States,[20] Chief Justice Taft offered the following explanation of the origin and limitations of this idea as a postulate of constitutional law: "The well-known maxim '_Delegata potestas non potest delegari_,' applicable to the law of agency in the general and common law, is well understood and has had wider application in the construction of our Federal and |
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