separate State, was tried, and was found to fail. South Carolina
took upon herself to act as she might have acted had that
confederation remained in force; but that confederation was an
acknowledged failure. National greatness could not be achieved
under it, and individual enterprise could not succeed under it.
Then in lieu of that, by the united consent of the thirteen States,
the present Constitution was drawn up and sanctioned, and to that
every State bound itself in allegiance. In that Constitution no
power of secession is either named or presumed to exist. The
individual sovereignty of the States had, in the first instance,
been thought desirable. The young republicans hankered after the
separate power and separate name which each might then have
achieved; but that dream had been found vain--and therefore the
States, at the cost of some fond wishes, agreed to seek together for
national power rather than run the risks entailed upon separate
existence. Those of my readers who may be desirous of examining
this matter for themselves, are referred to the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution of the United States. The latter
alone is clear enough on the subject, but is strengthened by the
former in proving that under the latter no State could possess the
legal power of seceding.

But they who created the Constitution, who framed the clauses, and
gave to this terribly important work what wisdom they possessed, did
not presume to think that it could be final. The mode of altering
the Constitution is arranged in the Constitution. Such alterations
must be proposed either by two-thirds of both the houses of the
general Congress, or by the legislatures of two-thirds of the
States; and must, when so proposed, be ratified by the legislatures
of three-fourths of the States, (Article V.) There can, I think, be