as early as 1804, they began to bow the metaphysical neck beneath
the historical yoke. They taught that philosophy is only the
amended sum of all philosophies, that systems pass with the age
whose impress they bear #79, that the problem is to focus the rays of
wandering but extant truth, and that history is the source of
philosophy, if not quite a substitute for it #80. Comte begins a
volume with the words that the preponderance of history over
philosophy was the characteristic of the time he lived in. Since
Cuvier first recognised the conjunction between the course of
inductive discovery and the course of civilisation #82, science had
its share in saturating the age with historic ways of thought,
and subjecting all things to that influence for which the
depressing names historicism and historical-mindedness have been
devised.

There are certain faults which are corrigible mental defects on
which I ought to say a few denouncing words, because they are
common to us all. First: the want of an energetic understanding
of the sequence and real significance of events, which would be
fatal to a practical politician, is ruin to a student of history,
who is the politician with his face turned backwards #83. It is
playing at study, to see nothing but the unmeaning and unsuggestive
surface, as we generally do. Then we have a curious proclivity
to neglect, and by degrees to forget, what has been certainly known.
An instance or two will explain my idea. The most popular English
writer relates how it happened in his presence that the title of
Tory was conferred upon the Conservative party. For it was an
opprobrious name at the time, applied to men for whom the Irish
Government offered head-money; so that if I have made too sure
of progress, I may at least complacently point to this instance