Obj. 4: Further, movement towards the end belongs to the will, whose
object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not of the
will, but of the intellect. Therefore "to believe in God," which
implies movement towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species
of that act.

_On the contrary_ is the authority of Augustine who makes this
distinction (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi--Tract. xxix in Joan.).

_I answer that,_ The act of any power or habit depends on the relation
of that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be
considered in three ways. For, since "to believe" is an act of the
intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above
(A. 1, ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part
of the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect.

If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can
be observed in the object of faith, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). One
of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of
faith is "to believe in a God"; because, as stated above (ibid.)
nothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is
referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it
is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point
of faith; and thus an act of faith is "to believe God," since, as
stated above (ibid.) the formal object of faith is the First Truth,
to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent for Its sake to
whatever he believes.

Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the
intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is "to believe in