feature of the plan--the detention of troops that would otherwise
strengthen Rosecrans in the decisive battle to be fought south of the
Tennessee. He contended, moreover, that a raid into Indiana and Ohio,
the more especially as important political elections were pending there,
would cause troops to be withdrawn from Rosecrans and Burnside for the
protection of those States. But General Bragg refused permission to
cross the Ohio, and instructed Morgan to make the raid as originally
designed.

[Illustration: THE MORGAN RAID.

_JULY 1863._]

Some weeks previous to this conference, by Morgan's direction I had sent
competent men to examine the fords of the upper Ohio. He had even then
contemplated such an expedition. It had long been his conviction that
the Confederacy could maintain the struggle only by transferring
hostilities and waging war, whenever opportunity offered, on Northern
soil. Upon his return from this interview he told me what had been
discussed, and what were General Bragg's instructions. He said that he
meant to disobey them; that the emergency, he believed, justified
disobedience. He was resolved to cross the Ohio River and invade Indiana
and Ohio. His command would probably be captured, he said; but in no
other way could he give substantial aid to the army. General Bragg had
directed Morgan to detail two thousand men for the expedition. From the
two brigades commanded respectively by myself and Colonel Adam R.
Johnson, Morgan selected twenty-four hundred and sixty of the
best-mounted and most effective. He took with him four pieces of
artillery--two 3-inch Parrotts, attached to the First Brigade, and two
12-pounder howitzers, attached to the Second.