to intercept him there. If these troops lined the railroad and were
judiciously posted, he knew it would be extremely difficult to elude
them or cut his way through them. He believed that if he could pass this
ordeal safely, the success of the expedition would be assured, unless
the river should be so high that the boats would be able to transport
troops to intercept him at the upper fords.

After remaining at Harrison two or three hours, and sending detachments
in the direction of Hamilton, he moved with the entire column on the
Hamilton road. But as soon as he was clear of the town, he cut the
telegraph-wires--previously left intact with the hope that they might be
used to convey intelligence of his apparent movement toward
Hamilton--and, turning across the country, gained the direct road to
Cincinnati. He hoped that, deceived by his demonstrations at Harrison,
the larger part of the troops at Cincinnati would be sent to Hamilton,
and that it would be too late to recall them when his movement toward
Cincinnati was discovered. He trusted that those remaining would be
drawn into the city, under the impression that he meant to attack,
leaving the way clear for his rapid transit. He has been criticized for
not attempting the capture of Cincinnati, but he had no mind to involve
his handful of wearied men in a labyrinth of streets. We felt very much
more at home amid rural surroundings. But if he had taken Cincinnati,
and had safely crossed the river there, the raid would have been so much
briefer, and its principal object to that extent defeated by the
release of the troops pursuing us.

[Illustration: LOOKING FOR THE FOOTPRINTS OF THE VAN.]

We reached the environs of Cincinnati about ten o'clock at night, and
were not clear of them until after daybreak. My brigade was marching in