the powers of executory Government, rendering us abroad
contemptible, and at home distracted; he will believe, also, that
nothing but a firm combination of public men against this body, and
that, too, supported by the hearty concurrence of the people at
large, can possibly get the better of it. The people will see the
necessity of restoring public men to an attention to the public
opinion, and of restoring the Constitution to its original
principles. Above all, they will endeavour to keep the House of
Commons from assuming a character which does not belong to it. They
will endeavour to keep that House, for its existence for its powers,
and its privileges, as independent of every other, and as dependent
upon themselves, as possible. This servitude is to a House of
Commons (like obedience to the Divine law), "perfect freedom." For
if they once quit this natural, rational, and liberal obedience,
having deserted the only proper foundation of their power, they must
seek a support in an abject and unnatural dependence somewhere else.
When, through the medium of this just connection with their
constituents, the genuine dignity of the House of Commons is
restored, it will begin to think of casting from it, with scorn, as
badges of servility, all the false ornaments of illegal power, with
which it has been, for some time, disgraced. It will begin to think
of its old office of CONTROL. It will not suffer that last of evils
to predominate in the country; men without popular confidence,
public opinion, natural connection, or natural trust, invested with
all the powers of Government.

When they have learned this lesson themselves, they will be willing
and able to teach the Court, that it is the true interest of the
Prince to have but one Administration; and that one composed of
those who recommend themselves to their Sovereign through the